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RESUMEN 
Este trabajo desarrolla algunas condiciones generales para analizar los juegos 
bicooperativos introducidos por Bilbao (2000). El objetivo es definir los valores 
probabilísticos para estos juegos y estudiar con detalle cada uno de los axiomas 
que caracterizan a estos valores. De acuerdo con el trabajo de Weber (1988), se 
introducen estos axiomas de forma secuencial y se observa su influencia en las 
expresiones del valor probabilístico. Además, se definen los valores compatibles con 
un orden y se establece la relación entre estos valores y los valores eficientes con 
componentes formadas por valores probabilísticos. 
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The present paper develops some general conditions under which we analize the 
bicooperative games introduced by Bilbao (2000). We define the probabilistic 
values for these games and observe in detail the axioms that characterize such 
values. Following the work of Weber (1988), these axioms are sequentially 
introduced observing how they have repercussions on the probabilistic value 
expression. Also, we introduce the compatible-order values and show the 
relationship between these values and the efficiency values such that their 
components are probabilistic values. 
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1. Introduction
The theory of cooperative games studies situations where a group of people/agents
are associated to look for a proﬁt as a result of their cooperation. Thus, a cooperative
game is deﬁned as a pair (N,v), where N is a ﬁnite set and v :2 N → R is a function
verifying that v(∅)=0 . For each S ∈ 2N, the worth v(S) can be interpreted as the
maximal gain or minimal cost that the players which form the coalition S can achieve
themselves against the best oﬀensive threat by the complementary coalition N \ S.
Classical market games for economies with private goods are examples of cooperative
games. Then we can say that a cooperative game has orthogonal coalitions (see
Myerson, 1991).
Games with non-orthogonal coalitions are games in which the worths to a coalition
S are not independent of the actions of coalition N \ S. Clearly, social situations
involving externalities and public goods are such cases. For instance, we consider a
group of agents with a common good which is causing them expenses or costs. In a
external or internal way a modiﬁcation (sale, buying, etc.) of this good is proposed
them. This action will suppose a greater proﬁtt ot h e mi nc a s et h e ya l la g r e ew i t ht h e
change proposed about the actual situation of the good. Moreover, even though the
patrimonial good can be divisible, we suppose that the greatest value of the selling
operation/modiﬁcation is reached if we consider all the common good.
These situations may be interpreted in the following manner. We consider pairs
(S,T),w i t hS,T ⊆ N and S ∩ T = ∅. Thus, (S,T) is a partition of the set N of all
players in three groups. Players in S are defenders of modifying the actual situation
and they want to accept a proposal; players in T do not agree with modifying the
situation and they will take action against any change. Finally, the members of
N \ (S ∪ T) are not convinced of the proﬁts derived from the proposal, but they do
not think of objecting and stop the action managed by the elements of coalition S.
From the theory of cooperative games, a possibility of modeling the non-orthogonal
situations could be to consider the set of all the ordered pairs of disjoint coalitions,
that is, the set 3N = {(S,T):S,T ⊆ N, S ∩ T = ∅} of all signed coalitions and de-
ﬁne a function b :3 N → R.F o re a c h(S,T) ∈ 3N, the worth b(S,T) can be interpreted
as the maximal gain (whenever b(S,T) > 0) or minimal loss (whenever b(S,T) < 0)
that the players of the coalition S can achieve when they decide to play together
against the players of T and the players of N \(S ∪ T) not taking part. This leads us
in a natural way into the concept of bicooperative game introduced by Bilbao (2000).
Similarly to the cooperative case in which each coalition S ∈ 2N can be identiﬁed
with a {0,1}-vector, each signed coalition (S,T) ∈ 3N can be identiﬁed with the





1 if i ∈ S,
−1 if i ∈ T,
0 otherwise.
An especial kind of bicooperative games has been studied by Felsenthal and Ma-Probabilistic values for bicooperative games 3
chover (1997) who consider ternary voting games. This concept is a generalization of
voting games which recognizes abstention as an option alongside yes and no votes.
These games are given by mappings u :3 N → {−1,1} satisfying the following three
conditions: u(N,∅)=1 , u(∅,N)=−1,a n d1(S,T) (i) ≤ 1(S0,T0) (i) for all i ∈ N,
implies u(S,T) ≤ u(S0,T0). A negative outcome, −1, is interpreted as defeat and a
positive outcome, 1, as passage of a bill.
Let us brieﬂy outline the contents of our work. In the next section, we study some
properties and characteristics of the set 3N, and introduce the bicooperative games.
The aim of the third section is to analyze the individual valuation of the prospects
of the players from their participation in a bicooperative game. The probabilistic
values for bicooperative games are deﬁned and a characterization of these values is
obtained. This characterization is given by a set of axioms which are sequentially
introduced with the purpose of showing the repercussion of each one in the expression
of the probabilistic value. Finally, the last part is devoted to the study of the values
with the eﬃciency property. In a bicooperative game, as the same as a cooperative
case, we suppose that the total saving is distributed among the players. When a
value carries out this objective, it is said that it veriﬁes the eﬃciency axiom. The
relationship between the eﬃciency of a value and the property that its components
are probabilistic values is shown. This lead us to the deﬁnition of the compatible-
order values and we prove that they are eﬃciency values such that their components
are probabilistic values.
2. The formal framework
Let N = {1,...,n} be a ﬁnite set and let 3N = {(A,B):A,B ⊆ N, A∩ B = ∅}.
Grabisch and Labreuche (2002) proposed a relation in 3N given by





is a partially ordered set (or poset) with the following properties:
1. (∅,N) is the ﬁrst element: (∅,N) v (A,B) for all (A,B) ∈ 3N.
2. (N,∅) is the last element: (A,B) v (N,∅) for all (A,B) ∈ 3N.
3. Every pair of elements of 3N has a join (A,B) ∨ (C,D)=( A ∪ C,B ∩ D) and




is a ﬁnite distributive
lattice.
Two pairs (A,B) and (C,D) are comparable if (A,B) v (C,D) or (C,D) v
(A,B);otherwise, (A,B) and (C,D) are incomparable. A chain of 3N is an induced





chains have the same number of elements and this number is 2n +1 .T h u s , w e
can consider the rank function ρ :3 N → {0,1,...,2n} such that ρ[(∅,N)] = 0 and
ρ[(S,T)] = ρ[(A,B)]+1 if (S,T) covers (A,B), that is, if (A,B) @ (S,T) and there
no exists (H,J) ∈ 3N such that (A,B) @ (H,J) @ (S,T).Probabilistic values for bicooperative games 4
For the distributive lattice 3N,l e tP denote the set of all nonzero ∨-irreducible
elements. Then P is the disjoint union C1 + C2 + ···+ Cn of the chains
Ci = {(∅,N\{ i}), (i,N \{ i})}, 1 ≤ i ≤ n = |N|.
An order ideal of P is a subset I of P such that if x ∈ I and y ≤ x,t h e ny ∈ I.
The set of all order ideals of P, ordered by inclusion, is the distributive lattice J(P),
where the lattice operations ∨ and ∧ are just ordinary union and intersection. The
fundamental theorem for ﬁnite distributive lattices (see [5, Theorem 3.4.1]) states
that the map ϕ :3 N → J(P) given by(A,B) 7→ {(X,Y) ∈ P :( X,Y) v (A,B)} is
an isomorphism.
Example. Let N = {1,2}.T h e nP = {(∅,{1}),(∅,{2}),({2},{1}),({1},{2})} is the
disjoint union of the chains (∅,{1}) @ ({2},{1}) and (∅,{2}) @ ({1},{2}).W ew i l l






















































































Proposition 1. The number of maximal chains of 3N is (2n)!/2n,w h e r en = |N|.
Proof. The number of maximal chains of 3N is equal to the number of maximal
chains of J(P) and this number is also equal to the number of extensions e(P) of P
to a total order (see Stanley [5, Section 3.5]). Since P = C1 + ···+ Cn,w h e r et h e
chain Ci satisﬁes |Ci| =2for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we can apply the enumeration of lattice









Taking into account the above framework, we introduce bicooperative games.Probabilistic values for bicooperative games 5
Deﬁnition 1. A bicooperative game is a pair (N,b), where N = {1,...,n} is a ﬁnite
set of n ≥ 2 players and b :3 N → R is a function satisfying b(∅,∅)=0 .
The set of all bicooperative games with a ﬁxed player set N is denoted by BGN.
With respect to addition of games and multiplication of games by real numbers,
the set BGN is a real vector space. There are three special collections of games in
BGN taking values in {−1,0,1}:t h eidentity games, the superior unanimity games
and the inferior unanimity games which are deﬁned, for any (S,T) ∈ 3N such that
(S,T) 6=( ∅,∅) as follows.
The identity game δ(S,T) :3 N → R is deﬁned by
δ(S,T) (A,B)=
½
1 if (A,B)=( S,T),
0 otherwise.
The superior unanimity game u(S,T) :3 N → R is given by
u(S,T) (A,B)=
½
1 if (S,T) v (A,B) 6=( ∅,∅),
0 otherwise.
The inferior unanimity game u(S,T) :3 N → R is deﬁned by
u(S,T) (A,B)=
½
−1 if (∅,∅) 6=( A,B) v (S,T),
0 otherwise.
Proposition 2. The dimension of the vector space BGN is 3n − 1 and the sets of
games
©








u(S,T) :( S,T) ∈ 3N, (S,T) 6=( ∅,∅)
o
are bases of BGN.
Proof. I ti se v i d e n tt h a tt h es e t
©
δ(S,T) :( S,T) ∈ 3N, (S,T) 6=( ∅,∅)
ª
is a basis





and the equality X
{(S,T)∈3N:(S,T)6=(∅,∅)}
α(S,T)δ(S,T) = 0
implies that α(S,T) =0for every (S,T) ∈ 3N with (S,T) 6=( ∅,∅). In order to prove
that the sets of the superior unanimity games and the inferior unanimity games are
bases of BGN are suﬃcient to show that they are independent linear systems. If
X
{(S,T)∈3N:(S,T)6=(∅,∅)}




and we apply these equations to the diﬀerent elements of 3N then we obtain homo-
geneous linear systems with the trivial solution as unique solution. ¤Probabilistic values for bicooperative games 6
3. Probabilistic values
A value on BGN is a mapping Φ : BGN → Rn that associates with each game b ∈ BGN
a vector (Φ1 (b),...,Φn (b)) ∈ Rn, where the real number Φi (b) represents the payoﬀ
to player i in the game b. The mapping Φi : BGN → R is the value for player i ∈ N on
BGN. This value represents an individual assessment for i of his or her expectations
from playing bicooperative games. From now on, we will write S ∪i and S \i instead
of S ∪ {i} and S \{ i} respectively.
Deﬁnition 2. Av a l u eΦi for player i on BGN is a probabilistic value if there exist
two collections of real numbers
n
pi





(S,T) :( S,T) ∈ 3N\i
o
satisfying pi















(S,T) (b(S ∪ i,T) − b(S,T)) + pi
(S,T) (b(S,T) − b(S,T ∪ i))
i
for every game b ∈ BGN.
Observe that in a probabilistic value Φi,p l a y e ri estimates his participation in
the game, evaluating his marginal contributions b(S ∪i,T)−b(S,T) whenever i joins
coalition S ⊆ N \ i and his marginal contributions b(S,T) − b(S,T ∪ i) whenever i
leaves coalition T ∪ i, where T ⊆ N \ i. If pi
(S,T) is the subjective probability that
player i joins S and pi
(S,T) is the subjective probability that player i leaves T ∪i, then
Φi (b) is his expected payoﬀ from the game b.
We will follow the work of Weber (1988) to obtain an axiomatic development
of the probabilistic values for bicooperative games. First, we consider the linearity
property.
Linearity axiom.T h e v a l u e Φi satisﬁes Φi(αb + βw)=αΦi(b)+βΦi(w), for all
α,β ∈ R,a n db,w ∈ BGN.
Theorem 3. Let Φi beavalueforplayer i on BGN which satisﬁes the linearity axiom.
Then there is a unique set of real numbers
n
ai








for every game b ∈ BGN.
Proof. The collection of identity games is a basis of BGN,a n de a c hg a m eb ∈ BGN




b(S,T)δ(S,T).Probabilistic values for bicooperative games 7










for all (S,T) 6=( ∅,∅). ¤
Next we introduce the concept of dummy player, understanding that player i is a
dummy player when his contributions to signed coalitions (S ∪ i,T) formed with his
incorporation to S and his contributions to signed coalitions (S,T) formed with his
desertion of T ∪ i coincide exactly with his individual contributions.
Deﬁnition 3. Ap l a y e ri ∈ N is a dummy in b ∈ BGN if, for every (S,T) ∈ 3N\i, it
holds
b(S ∪ i,T) − b(S,T)) = b({i},∅) and b(S,T) − b(S,T ∪ i)=−b(∅,{i}).
Note that it is possible to deﬁne the dummy player in a game as the player such
that all marginal contributions b(S ∪ i,T) − b(S,T ∪ i) coincide, that is, a player
i ∈ N is a dummy in b ∈ BGN if, for all (S,T) ∈ 3N\i,
b(S ∪ i,T) − b(S,T ∪ i)=b({i},∅) − b(∅,{i}).
It is also obvious that the ﬁrst deﬁnition implies the second one but the reciprocal is
not true. As a direct consequence of Deﬁnition 3 we obtain the following properties.
Proposition 4. For all i ∈ N, it holds
(1) Player i is a dummy in the superior unanimity game u({i},N\i).
(2) Player i is a dummy in the inferior unanimity game u(N\i,{i}).
Proposition 5. Let i ∈ N and (A,B) ∈ 3N\i. If wi




   
   
wi
(A,B) (S \ i,T) if i ∈ S,
wi
(A,B) (S,T \ i) if i ∈ T,
1 if i/ ∈ S ∪ T, (∅,∅) 6=( S,T) v (A,B),
0 otherwise,
for (S,T) ∈ 3N, then player i is a dummy in wi
(A,B).
Player i is a dummy in b ∈ BGN if it has no meaningful strategic role in the game,
since his contributions to the coalitions formed with his incorporation or desertion
coincide. Therefore, the value that this player should expect in the game b mustProbabilistic values for bicooperative games 8
exactly be the sum up of his marginal contributions. This consideration justiﬁes the
introduction to the following axiom.
Dummy axiom. If player i ∈ N is dummy in b ∈ BGN, then the value
Φi(b)=b({i},∅) − b(∅,{i}).
In the following result, we can observe that if we add the dummy axiom to the
linearity axiom, then the value for player i can be expressed as a linear combination
of his marginal contributions.










(S,T) (b(S ∪ i,T) − b(S,T)) + pi






















































Let us consider the collection of games wi
(A,B) :3 N → R,w h e r e(A,B) ∈ 3N\i and
wi
(A,B) is the game deﬁned in Proposition 5. Since player i is a dummy in wi
(A,B) for





=0by the dummy axiom. If we apply










=0 .Probabilistic values for bicooperative games 9
We show, by induction on ρ[(S,T)], the rank of the signed coalitions, that for






















Now assume the property for (H,J) ∈ 3N\i with ρ[(H,J)] ≤ k −1 and suppose that
































where the last but one equality follows from the induction hypothesis, and the last




























(S,T) (b(S ∪ i,T) − b(S,T)) + pi
(S,T) (b(S,T) − b(S,T ∪ i))
i
.
































= u({i},N\i) ({i},∅) − u({i},N\i) (∅,{i})=1 .Probabilistic values for bicooperative games 10
































= u(N\i,{i}) ({i},∅) − u(N\i,{i}) (∅,{i})=1 . ¤
Deﬁnition 4. The game b ∈ BGN is monotonic if
(A,B) v (C,D) ⇒ b(A,B) ≤ b(C,D).
Monotonicity axiom. If b ∈ BGN is monotonic then the value Φi(b) ≥ 0.
If we introduce this new axiom in the hypothesis of the above theorem, we can
prove that the coeﬃcients pi
(S,T) and pi
(S,T) are non-negative.






(S,T) (b(S ∪ i,T) − b(S,T)) + pi
(S,T) (b(S,T) − b(S,T ∪ i))
i
,
for every game b ∈ BGN. If Φi satisﬁes the monotonicity axiom then pi
(S,T) ≥ 0 and
pi
(S,T) ≥ 0 for all (S,T) ∈ 3N\i.
Proof. For (S,T) ∈ 3N\i with |S| ≥ |T|, consider the game ζ
i










(S,T) (A,B \ i) if i ∈ B,
1 if (S,T) @ (A,B),
0 otherwise,
and for every (S,T) ∈ 3N\i with |S| < |T|, the game ζ
i









(S,T) (A \ i,B) if i ∈ A, (A \ i,B) 6=( S,T),
−1 if (S,T) w (A,B),
0 otherwise.Probabilistic values for bicooperative games 11
The game ζ
i









































(S,T) ≥ 0 for every (S,T) ∈ 3N\i. Similarly, for each (S,T) ∈ 3N\i with
|S| > |T|, we consider the game ζi







(S,T) (A,B \ i) if i ∈ B, (A,B \ i) 6=( S,T),
1 if (S,T) v (A,B),
0 otherwise,
and for every (S,T) ∈ 3N\i with |S| ≤ |T|, the game ζi







(S,T) (A \ i,B) if i ∈ A,
−1 if (S,T) A (A,B),
0 otherwise.
The game ζi


































(S,T) ≥ 0 for every (S,T) ∈ 3N\i. ¤
It is easy to check that every probabilistic value satisﬁes the linearity, dummy
and monotonicity axioms. Therefore, we obtain the following characterization of the
probabilistic value for a player i from the combination of the above results.
Theorem 8. Let Φi be a value for player i on BGN. The value Φi is a probabilistic
value if and only if Φi satisﬁes the linearity, dummy and monotonicity axioms.Probabilistic values for bicooperative games 12
4. Efficient values
In a cooperative game v :2 N → R, it is assumed that all players decide to cooperate
among them and form the grand coalition N.This leads to the problem of distributing




In this section, we study the class of values Φ : BGN → Rn that provide an
equitable distribution of the total saving among the players. Taking into account
diﬀerent situations that can be modelled by a bicooperative game b :3 N → R,t h e
amount b(N,∅) is the maximal gain and b(∅,N) is the minimal loss obtained by the
players when they decide full cooperation. Then the maximal global gain is given by
b(N,∅) − b(∅,N).
From this perspective, an eﬃcient value must satisfy the following axiom.




for every b ∈ BGN.
The following theorem characterizes the values which are eﬃcient.






(S,T) (b(S ∪ i,T) − b(S,T)) + pi
(S,T) (b(S,T) − b(S,T ∪ i))
i
,
for every game b and for all i ∈ N.T h e nΦ satisﬁes the eﬃciency axiom if and only

























for all (S,T) ∈ 3N, with (S,T) / ∈ {(∅,∅),(∅,N),(N,∅)}.Probabilistic values for bicooperative games 13










(S,T) (b(S ∪ i,T) − b(S,T)) + pi



































































If the coeﬃcients satisfy the relations of theorem, then Φ satisﬁes the eﬃciency axiom.
Conversely, ﬁx (S,T) ∈ 3N such that (S,T) 6=( ∅,∅). Applying the above equality






























otherwise. Thus, if Φ satisﬁes the eﬃciency axiom, the relations for the coeﬃcients
are true. ¤
A particular case of eﬃcient value which i-th component satisﬁes the linearity,




s!(n − s − 1)!
n!
[b(S ∪ i,N \ (S ∪ i)) − b(S,N \ S)].
Note that, for any bicooperative game b ∈ BGN, this value is the Shapley value
corresponding to the cooperative game (N,v), where v :2 N → R is deﬁned by
v(A)=b(A,N \ A) if A 6= ∅, and v(∅)=0 . This value is not satisfactory for
any bicooperative game in the sense that only consider the contributions to signed
coalitions in which all players take part. Moreover, there is an inﬁnity of diﬀerent
bicooperative games which give rise to the same cooperative game.Probabilistic values for bicooperative games 14
5. Compatible-order values
We now consider values which result from a common perception for all players. It is
assumed that all of them estimate that (N,∅) is formed as a sequential process where
in each step a diﬀerent player is incorporated to the ﬁrst coalition or a diﬀerent
player leaves the second one. These sequential processes are obtained considering the
diﬀerent chains from (∅,N) to (N,∅). In each one of these processes, a player can
evaluate his contribution when is incorporated to a coalition S or his contribution
when leaves a coalition T. This can be reﬂected in the vectors of Rn denominated
superior marginal worth vectors and inferior marginal worth vectors.W i t ht h ea i m
to formalize this idea, we introduce the following notation.
Given N = {1,...,n}, let N = {−n,...,−1,1,...,n}. To each (S,T) ∈ 3N we
deﬁne the set (S,T)=S ∪ {−i : i ∈ N \ T} ⊆ N. Note that this correspondence is
one to one. For instance, (∅,N)=∅ and (N,∅)=N. Since S ∩ T = ∅⇔S ⊆ N \ T





, we consider the set of all maximal chains which going from
(∅,N) to (N,∅) and denote this set by Θ
¡
3N¢
.L e tθ ∈ Θ
¡
3N¢
be the maximal chain
(∅,N) @ (S1,T 1) @ ···@ (Sj,T j) @ ···@ (S2n−1,T 2n−1) @ (N,∅),
and we obtain the associated chain of sets
∅⊂{i1} ⊂ ···⊂ {i1,...,i j} ⊂ ···⊂ {i1,...,i 2n−1} ⊂ N.
where {i1,...,i j} = (Sj,T j) for j =1 ,...,2n. We deﬁne the vector θ(ij)=( i1,...,i j),
where the last component ij ∈ N satisﬁes the following property: if ij > 0 then player
ij ∈ Sj and ij / ∈ Sj−1,t h a ti s ,ij i st h el a s tp l a y e rw h oj o i n sSj and if ij < 0, then
player −ij / ∈ Tj and −ij ∈ Tj−1, that is, −ij is the last player who leaves Tj−1.
Equivalently, the elements in θ(ij)=( i1,i 2,...,i j) are written following the order of
incorporation or desertion in the chain θ (depending on the sign of each ik). There-
fore, we obtain an equivalence between maximal chains and vectors θ =( i1,...,i 2n).
For example, let N = {1,2,3} and let θ be the maximal chain
(∅,N) @ (∅,{1,3}) @ ({2},{1,3}) @ ({2},{1}) @ ({2},∅) @ ({2,3},∅) @ (N,∅).
Its associated chain of sets is given by
∅⊂{−2} ⊂ {−2,2} ⊂ {−2,2,−3} ⊂ {−2,2,−3,−1} ⊂ {−2,2,−3,−1,3} ⊂ N.
Thus, we can represent the maximal chain by the order θ =( −2,2,−3,−1,3,1).
If θ(ij)=( i1,...,i j) we deﬁne α[θ(ij)] = (Sj,T j) such that (Sj,T j)={i1,...,i j}.
In particular, α[θ(i2n)] = (N,∅) and α[θ(i1) \ i1]=( ∅,N).
Deﬁnition 5. Let θ ∈ Θ
¡
3N¢
and b ∈ BGN.T h e nmθ (b),M θ (b) ∈ Rn,w h e r e
mθ
i (b)=b(α[θ(−i)]) − b(α[θ(−i) \ −i]),M θ
i (b)=b(α[θ(i)]) − b(α[θ(i) \ i]),
are the inferior and superior marginal worth vectors with respect to θ, respectively.Probabilistic values for bicooperative games 15











= b(N,∅) − b(∅,N).
Proof. Let b ∈ BGN and θ ∈ Θ
¡
3N¢















[b(α[θ(ij)]) − b(α[θ(ij) \ ij])]




= b(N,∅) − b(∅,N). ¤
Deﬁnition 6. A compatible-order value on BGN is a value Ψ =( Ψ1,...,Ψn) such
that there exists a collection
©
pθ : θ ∈ Θ
¡
3N¢ª














for all i ∈ N and all b ∈ BGN.
A compatible-order value is a value where each player evaluates his marginal
contributions in the processes of formation of (N,∅) with a common perception of
the probability of these processes. The relation between the compatible-order values
and the values that satisﬁes the eﬃciency axiom is stated in the following theorems.
Theorem 11. Let Ψ =( Ψ1,...,Ψn) be a compatible-order value on BGN.T h e nΨ
satisﬁes the eﬃciency axiom and each component of Ψ is a probabilistic value.
Proof. Let
©
pθ : θ ∈ Θ
¡
3N¢ª

















pθ [b(α[θ(i)]) − b(α[θ(i) \ i])],
for all i ∈ N and all b ∈ BGN.I fθ runs over all orders in Θ
¡
3N¢
, the sets α[θ(i) \ i]
determine all signed coalitions (S,T) ∈ 3N\i in which i is incorporated in the orderProbabilistic values for bicooperative games 16
and the sets α[θ(−i)] determine all signed coalitions (S,T) ∈ 3N\i in which player i
has just leave the preceding signed coalition in the order. Thus, the above expression




















[b(α[θ(−i)]) − b(α[θ(−i) \ −i])]

.












(S,T) ≥ 0 and pi









To prove the claim, ﬁx i and runs all (S,T) ∈ 3N\i in which player i joins to S.
















Similarly, we show that
P
(S,T)∈3N\i pi
(S,T) =1 . It follows that Ψi is a probabilistic





























pθ [b(N,∅) − b(∅,N)]
= b(N,∅) − b(∅,N). ¤Probabilistic values for bicooperative games 17
Theorem 12. Let Φ =( Φ1,...,Φn) be a value on BGN that satisﬁes the eﬃciency
axiom and such that each component of Φ is a probabilistic value. Then Φ is a
compatible-order value.






(S,T) (b(S ∪ i,T) − b(S,T)) + pi
(S,T) (b(S,T) − b(S,T ∪ i))
i
.











that is, A(S,T) is the sum of the probabilities of all players that can join with S in
(S,T) and the probabilities of all players that can leave T in (S,T).F o ri ∈ N and








if A(S,T) 6=0 ,
0 otherwise,








if A(S,T) 6=0 ,
0 otherwise.
Note that A(i,(S,T)) is the quotient between the assigned probability for player i
from his union to S in (S,T) and the sum of probabilities A(S,T). In A(−i,(S,T)) we
consider the quotient between the assigned probability for player i from his desertion
from T in (S,T) and the sum of the probabilities A(S,T).
For θ =( i1,i 2,...,i 2n) ∈ Θ
¡
3N¢
, deﬁne the product
pθ = A(i1,α[θ(i1) \ i1])A(i2,α[θ(i2) \ i2])···A(i2n,α[θ(i2n) \ i2n]).











where the last equality follows from the eﬃciency axiom (see Theorem 9). Since
i2n > 0 the last factor is
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The collection
©
pθ : θ ∈ Θ
¡
3N¢ª



















pθ : θ ∈ Θ
¡
3N¢ª
is a ﬁnite probability distribution. Let Ψ be the compatible-































[b(α[θ(−i)]) − b(α[θ(−i) \ −i])]

.











for every (S,T) ∈ 3N\i.
We next prove the ﬁrst equality. The second one is similarly obtained. Let
(S,T) ∈ 3N\i with |S| = s and |T| = t. Then we consider a chain θ1 =( i1,...,i k),
where k = s + n − t, from (∅,N) to (S,T) and a chain θ2 =( ik+2,...,i 2n) from
(S ∪ i,T) to (N,∅). These chains can be concatenated with i to make a maximal


































A(i2n,(S ∪ i,T) ∪ {ik+2,...,i 2n−1}),
where ik ∈ (S,T) if ik ∈ S or −ik / ∈ T and (S,T) \{ ik} =( S \ ik,T) if ik > 0 and
(S,T) \{ ik} =( S,T ∪− ik) if ik < 0.A l s o ,(S ∪ i,T) ∪ {ik+2} =( S ∪ i ∪ ik+2,T) if
ik+2 > 0 and (S ∪ i,T \ −ik+2) otherwise.
F i r s tw ep r o v et h a tt h el a s t2n − k − 1 sums each, in turn, have value 1. Indeed,
if Hp =( S ∪ i,T) ∪ {ik+2,...,i p},k+2≤ p ≤ 2n − 1 and Hk+1 =( S ∪ i,T), then
X
{ip/ ∈(S∪i,T)∪{ik+2,...,ip−1}}


































If we now consider the ﬁrst k +1sums, we see that each numerator of one factor
is equal to the previous denominator by the eﬃciency axiom. Indeed, if we deﬁneProbabilistic values for bicooperative games 20






























Note that the numerator of each term
P
ip−1∈Lp





















Since these expressions are equal applying the equations of Theorem 9, the entire
expression simpliﬁes to pi
(S,T). ¤
A particular case of compatible-order value is the value Φ =( Φ1,...,Φn) on BGN,
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